1. This appeal is filed under Section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (hereinafter referred to as "the said Act"), taking exception to the order passed by the Commissioner, Workmen's Compensation dated 26th June, 2000. 2. This First Appeal has been filed by the Insurance Company. The appellant has assailed the order mainly on the ground that it was not liable to pay compensation under the provisions of the said Act. Whereas, the original complainant, respondent No. 1 in the first appeal has filed the above numbered cross objection praying for awarding interest and penalty under Section 4-A of the said Act. 3. The events giving rise to the filing of these proceedings are that : The respondent No. 1 filed an application dated 26th June, 1987 before the Commissioner of Workmen's Compensation, Government of Goa, claiming compensation from respondent No. 2. M/s. Aquarius Pvt. Ltd., contending that her husband Shripad V. Sawant met with fatal accident in the course of and arising out of employment on the barge of respondent No. 2 on 5-8-1985. According to respondent No. 1, her husband died on the barge on 4-8-1985 and his body was recovered on 5-8-1985, for which she claimed an amount of Rs. 30,000/- as compensation. During the pendency of the said application, sometime on 27-6-1991, respondent No. 1 moved an application praying that the appellant herein be joined as opposite party to the proceedings, as according to the respondent No. 1, the insurance company was also liable to pay compensation. Notice was issued on the said application to the appellant; and pursuant to the notice, the appellant filed written statement before the Commissioner on 24-2-1992. The appellant in its written statement contended that the application filed by respondent No. 1 herein was bad in law and not maintainable and that the Commissioner had no jurisdiction to entertain the same as there was no accident nor the death was caused arising out of employment. In so far as respondent No. 2 is concerned, in its reply, it took a stand that it was not liable to pay compensation as death was not on account of accident. According to the appellant as well as respondent No. 2, the death was caused due to heart attack and was a natural death for which no compensation need be paid under the provisions of the said Act. In other words, both the appellant as well as respondent No. 2 denied their liability to pay the compensation. Respondent No. 2 further contended that in any case the liability to pay compensation would be that of the appellant Insurance Company and that the stand taken by the Insurance Company be, therefore, rejected. Respondent No. 2 also contended that they have paid a sum of Rs. 6,000/- to respondent No. 1 and the said amount be deducted from the sum to be determined by the Court. 4. Respondent No. 1 besides adducing oral evidence, also relied on documentary evidence. Respondent No. 1 examined one Kalidas Naik who was working as Oilman with respondent No. 2 and he knew the deceased. He has stated that he was on duty along with the deceased and one Shri Raju on the barge "Aires" in the first fortnight of August, 1985. Their shift was from 1-8-1985 to 15-8-1985. This witness has deposed that the deceased was quite healthy when he left for duty on the previous day. Respondent No. 2 examined one Shri Savio Mascarenhas, the Chief Executive. He admits that the deceased was on duty from 1-8-1985, however, did not know as to what work was being carried out by the deceased on 4th and 5th August, 1985. He has stated that the deceased died of an heart attack, but admits that he had no knowledge whether the deceased had any previous history of heart ailment. He further states that the employees employed on the barges were insured with the Oriental Insurance Company Ltd., under Group Insurance Scheme. He further admits that they had submitted claim to the appellant Insurance Company claiming the compensation under the Group Insurance Scheme. The appellant Insurance Company examined one Gautam Pathak who admits that they had issued a policy to respondent No. 2 which covered the group of 17 persons against the personal accident and includes the name of the deceased as insured person. However, he has denied the liability of the Insurance Company as, according to him, the death was natural death and not accidental. 5. The Commissioner, on analyzing the evidence has, inter alia, found that there was no direct or positive evidence to discredit the claim of the respondent No. 1. He held that it is evident that the deceased died in the course of and arising out of the employment. The Commissioner found that the employment of the deceased was admittedly from 1-8-1985 till 15-8-1985 and the deceased died on duty on the barge on 4th and 5th August, 1985. The Commissioner further held that even though the respondent No. 2 claimed that it was not an accident, but death due to heart attack, in the present case, is an accidental death. The Commissioner also took into account that the respondent No. 2 had set up a claim for compensation under the Group Insurance Scheme against the appellant, which presupposes that even the respondent No. 2 had viewed the cause of death as an accident. In other words, according to the Commissioner, the respondent No. 2 was taking an inconsistent stand. The Commissioner further observed that although the post mortem report was brought on record which indicated that the death was caused due to heart attack, but the autopsy report of the expert, as mentioned at the end of the certificate-indicated that the statement about the cause of death was pending Chemical Analysis of viscera. The Commissioner observed that the said Chemical Analyser's report of viscera was never brought on record by respondent No. 2; and , therefore, it was unsafe to conclude that the the death was a natural death. The Commissioner further observed that the duty of the barge crew was so onerous that they were continuously required to remain on the board for 14 to 15 days as per the terms and conditions of their employment, which was not denied by the respondent No. 2. The evidence on record, as observed by the Commissioner, indicated that two injuries of the toe and leg of the deceased were noticed. The respondent No. 1 has asserted that the said injuries might have occurred as a result of fall and which might have aggravated his earlier ailment from which he was suffering and which eventually culminated in heart attack due to the nature of strenuous work on the barge. Having considered all the attending circumstances and the evidence on record, the Commissioner, therefore, took a view that the death or injury could be considered as accident even though it was brought about by an heart attack or some other cause to be found as connected to the condition of the deceased himself. The Commissioner, therefore, observed that there was enough scope to say that the work which the deceased was supposed to do on barge might have even led to acceleration of his ailment, if at all he was having, which led to the accident. 6. In the backdrop of the evidence on record, the Commissioner adjudicated the matter and concluded that the death of the deceased was an accident. He concluded that the accident can be said to have occurred not only when the workman was actually in discharge of his duties but also when he was engaged in the act belonging to or arising of such duties. In the circumstances, the Commissioner ordered that the respondent No. 2 and the appellant shall jointly and severally pay a sum of Rs. 59,868/- towards the compensation. 7. The appellant Insurance Company by this appeal has assailed the impugned order of the Commissioner. Shri Bharne, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant, inter alia, submits that there was no liability of the Insurance Company to pay compensation under the provisions of the said Act inasmuch as respondent No. 2 employer had not taken any policy under the said Act, but the policy issued by the appellant was one of Group Insurance Scheme. According to him, the liability to pay compensation under the Act is on the employer and not on the Insurance Company; and, in fact the Insurance Company is not a necessary party in the present proceeding. He submits that dependants of the deceased would be entitled to claim from the appellant/Insurance Company only as per the terms and conditions of the Group Personal Accident Policy and that the appellant is not liable to pay compensation under the provisions of the said Act. In substance, the plea taken is that there is no lis between the appellant/Insurance Company and respondent No. 1 and that the Insurance Company was neither a necessary nor a proper party to the present proceedings under the said Act. He further submits that the appeal should succeed on the above count and the impugned order passed by the Commissioner against the appellant deserves to be set aside. In so far as the findings on merits are concerned, it is submitted that even the same cannot be sustained. He submits that the death in question was caused due to heart attack, was a natural death; and, therefore, the dependants of the deceased were not entitled for any compensation under the provisions of the said Act. Shri Bharne, therefore, submits that the appeal be allowed and the impugned order be set aside against the appellant with further direction that the amount deposited by the appellant during the pendency of the appeal may be returned to the appellants. 8. Mrs. Agni, the learned Advocate appearing for the respondent No. 1, original claimant, on the other hand, contends that although the employer, namely respondent No. 2 is primarily liable to pay the compensation within the purport of Section3, however, that would not absolve the Insurance Company from its liability to pay compensation. According to her, from the plain language of section 19 of the Act, the claimant was entitled to implead any person who, according to the claimant, is liable to pay compensation under the provisions of the said Act; and that the Commissioner is under an obligation to examine the question as to whether such a person is liable to pay the compensation or not? According to her, there is express bar on the Civil Court to have jurisdiction to settle, decide or deal with any question which is by or under the Act of 1923 required to be settled, decided or dealt with by a Commissioner or to enforce any liability incurred under the said Act. According to her, it is not open for this Court to reappreciate the entire evidence on record, as generally available in exercise of jurisdiction of the first Appellate Court. She submits that it is only when substantial question of law arises, that this Court could entertain an appeal and in no other situation. She further submits that in any case, respondent No. 2 has failed to file any first appeal, though the impugned order has been passed against it; and, as such, respondent No. 2 has acquiesced of the said order and waived its right to file any appeal to challenge the correctness of the said decision on any count. She further submits that it is well settled that the death caused due to heart attack, is also an accident and the onus is on the employer to prove that one of the explanations provided for under Section 3 of the said Act, was attracted. She contends that in the absence of any evidence by the employer, it can be safely inferred on the basis of the attending circumstances that the death, in question, though caused by heart attack, was an accidental death in the course of and arising out of the employment with respondent No. 2. Besides opposing the appeal filed by the appellant/Insurance Company, the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has strenuously contended that respondent No. 2 cannot be permitted to assail the correctness of the order passed by the Commissioner, particularly when the respondent No. 2 has not filed any appeal nor any cross objection. She further submits that the cross objection filed on behalf of respondent No. 1 praying for further relief against the appellant as well as respondent No. 2 making them jointly and severally liable to pay interest as well as penalty in 1. This appeal is filed under Section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (hereinafter referred to as "the said Act"), taking exception to the order passed by the Commissioner, Workmen's Compensation dated 26th June, 2000. 2. This First Appeal has been filed by the Insurance Company. The appellant has assailed the order mainly on the ground that it was not liable to pay compensation under the provisions of the said Act. Whereas, the original complainant, respondent No. 1 in the first appeal has filed the above numbered cross objection praying for awarding interest and penalty under Section 4-A of the said Act. 3. The events giving rise to the filing of these proceedings are that : The respondent No. 1 filed an application dated 26th June, 1987 before the Commissioner of Workmen's Compensation, Government of Goa, claiming compensation from respondent No. 2. M/s. Aquarius Pvt. Ltd., contending that her husband Shripad V. Sawant met with fatal accident in the course of and arising out of employment on the barge of respondent No. 2 on 5-8-1985. According to respondent No. 1, her husband died on the barge on 4-8-1985 and his body was recovered on 5-8-1985, for which she claimed an amount of Rs. 30,000/- as compensation. During the pendency of the said application, sometime on 27-6-1991, respondent No. 1 moved an application praying that the appellant herein be joined as opposite party to the proceedings, as according to the respondent No. 1, the insurance company was also liable to pay compensation. Notice was issued on the said application to the appellant; and pursuant to the notice, the appellant filed written statement before the Commissioner on 24-2-1992. The appellant in its written statement contended that the application filed by respondent No. 1 herein was bad in law and not maintainable and that the Commissioner had no jurisdiction to entertain the same as there was no accident nor the death was caused arising out of employment. In so far as respondent No. 2 is concerned, in its reply, it took a stand that it was not liable to pay compensation as death was not on account of accident. According to the appellant as well as respondent No. 2, the death was caused due to heart attack and was a natural death for which no compensation need be paid under the provisions of the said Act. In other words, both the appellant as well as respondent No. 2 denied their liability to pay the compensation. Respondent No. 2 further contended that in any case the liability to pay compensation would be that of the appellant Insurance Company and that the stand taken by the Insurance Company be, therefore, rejected. Respondent No. 2 also contended that they have paid a sum of Rs. 6,000/- to respondent No. 1 and the said amount be deducted from the sum to be determined by the Court. 4. Respondent No. 1 besides adducing oral evidence, also relied on documentary evidence. Respondent No. 1 examined one Kalidas Naik who was working as Oilman with respondent No. 2 and he knew the deceased. He has stated that he was on duty along with the deceased and one Shri Raju on the barge "Aires" in the first fortnight of August, 1985. Their shift was from 1-8-1985 to 15-8-1985. This witness has deposed that the deceased was quite healthy when he left for duty on the previous day. Respondent No. 2 examined one Shri Savio Mascarenhas, the Chief Executive. He admits that the deceased was on duty from 1-8-1985, however, did not know as to what work was being carried out by the deceased on 4th and 5th August, 1985. He has stated that the deceased died of an heart attack, but admits that he had no knowledge whether the deceased had any previous history of heart ailment. He further states that the employees employed on the barges were insured with the Oriental Insurance Company Ltd., under Group Insurance Scheme. He further admits that they had submitted claim to the appellant Insurance Company claiming the compensation under the Group Insurance Scheme. The appellant Insurance Company examined one Gautam Pathak who admits that they had issued a policy to respondent No. 2 which covered the group of 17 persons against the personal accident and includes the name of the deceased as insured person. However, he has denied the liability of the Insurance Company as, according to him, the death was natural death and not accidental. 5. The Commissioner, on analyzing the evidence has, inter alia, found that there was no direct or positive evidence to discredit the claim of the respondent No. 1. He held that it is evident that the deceased died in the course of and arising out of the employment. The Commissioner found that the employment of the deceased was admittedly from 1-8-1985 till 15-8-1985 and the deceased died on duty on the barge on 4th and 5th August, 1985. The Commissioner further held that even though the respondent No. 2 claimed that it was not an accident, but death due to heart attack, in the present case, is an accidental death. The Commissioner also took into account that the respondent No. 2 had set up a claim for compensation under the Group Insurance Scheme against the appellant, which presupposes that even the respondent No. 2 had viewed the cause of death as an accident. In other words, according to the Commissioner, the respondent No. 2 was taking an inconsistent stand. The Commissioner further observed that although the post mortem report was brought on record which indicated that the death was caused due to heart attack, but the autopsy report of the expert, as mentioned at the end of the certificate-indicated that the statement about the cause of death was pending Chemical Analysis of viscera. The Commissioner observed that the said Chemical Analyser's report of viscera was never brought on record by respondent No. 2; and , therefore, it was unsafe to conclude that the the death was a natural death. The Commissioner further observed that the duty of the barge crew was so onerous that they were continuously required to remain on the board for 14 to 15 days as per the terms and conditions of their employment, which was not denied by the respondent No. 2. The evidence on record, as observed by the Commissioner, indicated that two injuries of the toe and leg of the deceased were noticed. The respondent No. 1 has asserted that the said injuries might have occurred as a result of fall and which might have aggravated his earlier ailment from which he was suffering and which eventually culminated in heart attack due to the nature of strenuous work on the barge. Having considered all the attending circumstances and the evidence on record, the Commissioner, therefore, took a view that the death or injury could be considered as accident even though it was brought about by an heart attack or some other cause to be found as connected to the condition of the deceased himself. The Commissioner, therefore, observed that there was enough scope to say that the work which the deceased was supposed to do on barge might have even led to acceleration of his ailment, if at all he was having, which led to the accident. 6. In the backdrop of the evidence on record, the Commissioner adjudicated the matter and concluded that the death of the deceased was an accident. He concluded that the accident can be said to have occurred not only when the workman was actually in discharge of his duties but also when he was engaged in the act belonging to or arising of such duties. In the circumstances, the Commissioner ordered that the respondent No. 2 and the appellant shall jointly and severally pay a sum of Rs. 59,868/- towards the compensation. 7. The appellant Insurance Company by this appeal has assailed the impugned order of the Commissioner. Shri Bharne, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant, inter alia, submits that there was no liability of the Insurance Company to pay compensation under the provisions of the said Act inasmuch as respondent No. 2 employer had not taken any policy under the said Act, but the policy issued by the appellant was one of Group Insurance Scheme. According to him, the liability to pay compensation under the Act is on the employer and not on the Insurance Company; and, in fact the Insurance Company is not a necessary party in the present proceeding. He submits that dependants of the deceased would be entitled to claim from the appellant/Insurance Company only as per the terms and conditions of the Group Personal Accident Policy and that the appellant is not liable to pay compensation under the provisions of the said Act. In substance, the plea taken is that there is no lis between the appellant/Insurance Company and respondent No. 1 and that the Insurance Company was neither a necessary nor a proper party to the present proceedings under the said Act. He further submits that the appeal should succeed on the above count and the impugned order passed by the Commissioner against the appellant deserves to be set aside. In so far as the findings on merits are concerned, it is submitted that even the same cannot be sustained. He submits that the death in question was caused due to heart attack, was a natural death; and, therefore, the dependants of the deceased were not entitled for any compensation under the provisions of the said Act. Shri Bharne, therefore, submits that the appeal be allowed and the impugned order be set aside against the appellant with further direction that the amount deposited by the appellant during the pendency of the appeal may be returned to the appellants. 8. Mrs. Agni, the learned Advocate appearing for the respondent No. 1, original claimant, on the other hand, contends that although the employer, namely respondent No. 2 is primarily liable to pay the compensation within the purport of Section3, however, that would not absolve the Insurance Company from its liability to pay compensation. According to her, from the plain language of section 19 of the Act, the claimant was entitled to implead any person who, according to the claimant, is liable to pay compensation under the provisions of the said Act; and that the Commissioner is under an obligation to examine the question as to whether such a person is liable to pay the compensation or not? According to her, there is express bar on the Civil Court to have jurisdiction to settle, decide or deal with any question which is by or under the Act of 1923 required to be settled, decided or dealt with by a Commissioner or to enforce any liability incurred under the said Act. According to her, it is not open for this Court to reappreciate the entire evidence on record, as generally available in exercise of jurisdiction of the first Appellate Court. She submits that it is only when substantial question of law arises, that this Court could entertain an appeal and in no other situation. She further submits that in any case, respondent No. 2 has failed to file any first appeal, though the impugned order has been passed against it; and, as such, respondent No. 2 has acquiesced of the said order and waived its right to file any appeal to challenge the correctness of the said decision on any count. She further submits that it is well settled that the death caused due to heart attack, is also an accident and the onus is on the employer to prove that one of the explanations provided for under Section 3 of the said Act, was attracted. She contends that in the absence of any evidence by the employer, it can be safely inferred on the basis of the attending circumstances that the death, in question, though caused by heart attack, was an accidental death in the course of and arising out of the employment with respondent No. 2. Besides opposing the appeal filed by the appellant/Insurance Company, the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has strenuously contended that respondent No. 2 cannot be permitted to assail the correctness of the order passed by the Commissioner, particularly when the respondent No. 2 has not filed any appeal nor any cross objection. She further submits that the cross objection filed on behalf of respondent No. 1 praying for further relief against the appellant as well as respondent No. 2 making them jointly and severally liable to pay interest as well as penalty in Submit